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RECENT CASES
IMPACT RULE ABOLISHED IN DELAWARE AND NEW
JERSEY-ACTION PERMITTED FOR INJURIES
ARISING FROM MERE FRIGHT-A PLEA TO
THE PENNSYLVANIA COURT
Robb v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965).
Falzone v. Busch,
45 N.J. 559, 214 A. 2d 12 (1965).
Updating their negligence law, the Supreme Courts of Dela-
ware and New Jersey in Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. 1 and Falzone v.
Busch2 unanimously allowed actions for bodily injuries arising from
negligently inflicted fright without physical impact. This is a step
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bosley v. Andrews3 was
unwilling to take. Robb was a case of first impression in Delaware
while Falzone overruled Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R.
4
In Robb, the plaintiff alleged that her car was stuck in a rut
which defendant railroad negligently permitted to form at a cross-
ing. While attempting to free her vehicle, she noticed a train ap-
proaching. She leaped from the car just before the train hit the
auto, hurling it into the air. Although she suffered fright and
consequential injury, she was in no way touched by the locomotive
or the airborne auto. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
The Falzone complaint averred that plaintiff Mabel Falzone
was seated in a lawfully parked car while her husband, also a
plaintiff, was standing in a field across the road. Defendant's car
struck Mr. Falzone and then veered across the road directly towards
the car in which Mrs. Falzone was seated, narrowly missing it.
Mrs. Falzone saw defendant strike her husband, and then observed
her position of peril. As a result of the near miss, Mrs. Falzone
suffered severe fright and consequential bodily injury.5 The Robb
1. 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965).
2. 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
3. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
4. 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
5. The New Jersey court did not consider whether one could maintain
an action for injuries arising from the apprehension of harm to another.
It is apparently settled in Delaware that one cannot. Williamson v. Wil-
mington Housing Authority, - Del. -, 208 A.2d 304 (1960). This is an
area of broad controversy. It is widely held that in such a case the negli-
gent party invades no legally protected right of the plaintiff-onlooker. See,
e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) wherein a
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and Falzone courts held that the complaints stated a cause of action.
Falzone also allowed the husband to recover for loss of consortium.'
The impact rule began in England with the decision of the
House of Lords in Victorian Ry. Comm'r v. Coultas.7 The court
concluded that damages from fright without impact were not the
consequence of the defendant's act. It was reasoned that to permit
recovery in such a case would be extending liability for negligence
too far8 and would subject the courts to many imaginary claims.
Victorian Ry. Comm'r had only a brief reign in England. It was
overruled in 190110 but was followed as precedent in the United
States.1 The current trend in the United States today, however,
seems to demand the abolition of any impact requirement.
12
Illustrative of the traditional arguments in favor of the impact
rule is Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 13 which Falzone overruled.
Firstly, it may be argued that physical injury is not a normal,
natural or probable consequence of fright in the case of a person of
ordinary physical condition. 14 The advance of medical knowledge
long ago resulted in the refutation of this contention. 5 It is now
widely recognized that emotional disturbance can and does cause
physical injury. Moreover, certain of the restrictive cases candidly
mother watching through a window saw defendant negligently kill her
daughter with an automobile. As a result of witnessing the tragedy, it
was alleged that the mother became emotionally distressed and died. The
Wisconsin court held that plaintiff's allegations did not bring the dead
mother's interest within the field of legally protected rights. See also
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513 (1963).
It would be interesting to speculate upon the extent to which Mrs. Falzone's
injuries were attributable to seeing her husband injured and to what extent
her injuries were attributable to fear for her own safety.
6. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965). It is interesting
to note that New Jersey recently allowed the wife to recover for loss of
her husband's consortium. Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America,
46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965) (gas explosion).
7. 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
8. Id. at 225.
9. Id. at 226.
10. Dilieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
11. West Chicago St. R.R. v. Liebeg, 79 Ill. App. 567 (1898); Spade
v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Ward v. West Jersey
& S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (overruled); Mitchell
v Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (overruled); Miller v.
Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Bosley v.
Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
12. PRossER, TORTS 351 n. 98 (3d ed. 1964).
13. 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
14. Victorian Ry. Comm'r v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888); Ward v.
West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
15. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); see
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497




recognize that mental shock may produce serious physical injury. 16
Another objection is that injuries resulting from fright are too
remote. 17 The courts have been very reluctant to compensate for
mental disturbance. The remoteness argument fails, however, be-
cause it has long been recognized that a technical assault is com-
pensable.18 The emotional disturbance, i.e., apprehension, is the
very thing for which the plaintiff in an assault action is being
compensated. Moreover, the slight impact cases also make it obvi-
ous that it is predominately the mental disturbance (and resulting
bodily consequences) which is being compensated. 9 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has found impact when, according to the
plaintiff's testimony, he suffered an electric shock when a trolley
wire fell on his car. 20 There were no external marks of physical
injury, yet plaintiff was allowed to recover for the fright-induced
psychoneurosis. 21 Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has meticulously adhered to the impact rule. Bosley v. Andrews 2
2
epitomizes the situation. An elderly woman was chased and se-
verely frightened by a runaway bull. She was precluded from
maintaining an action to recover for an alleged fright-accelerated
circulatory disorder. Presumably if the bulls' tail had so much as
grazed her, this would have supplied sufficient impact to place the
stamp of approval upon her claim.23  Is it not most reasonable to
suppose that a Georgia court was compensating for "remote" mental
disturbance and resulting physical manifestations when it found
impact due to a performing horse "evacuating his bowels" into
plaintiff's lap?
24
Certain restrictive courts have allowed recovery without im-
pact for mental disturbance resulting in physical manifestations
where the emotional disturbance is wilfully caused.25 The injuries
16. See Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). These cases
predominately relied upon a "public policy" argument.
17. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
18. I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y.B. 22 Edw. III f. 99 p. 60 (1349).
19. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky.
285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (slight burn); Homans v. Boston Elevated R.R.,
180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight blow); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 73 N.J.L. 577, 87 Atl. 130 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (dust in the eye); Zelinsky
v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (any degree of physical
impact, however slight).
20. Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948).
21. Ibid.
22. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
23. See Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961)
(any degree of physical impact, however slight).
24. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680
(1928).
25. Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kuzma v. Millinery
Workers Union Local No. 24, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (1953) (prior
to Falzone v. Busch); Boyce v. Greely Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. 106, 126
N.E. 647 (1920) (prior to Batalla v. State).
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are no less real if they are negligently inflicted. It is arguable that
Pennsylvania recognized this distinction in Cucinotti v. Ortman.
26
After citing authority that impact is required in cases of negligence,
the Cucinotti court noted that "the rule may be different where the
infliction is intentional.'27 The facts of Cucinotti, however, indi-
cated an intentional infliction of mental distress which the court
refused to recognize.28 In Cucinotti the plaintiffs were threatened
with great force and violence unless they left the premises by hood-
lums brandishing blackjacks. 29 While this did not constitute a tech-
nical assault because there was no showing that defendants placed
plaintiffs in immediate fear of bodily harm, it is difficult to perceive
how the defendants' acts failed to constitute an intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress."0  Their conduct was intended to frighten
the plaintiffs into leaving the premises.
Another exception to the impact requirement has developed in
those cases in which a person is injured attempting to avoid a haz-
ard negligently created by another.31 Thus, when one is injured
during an attempt to escape a runaway railroad car, he may recover
for the physical consequences of fright even though his original
location subsequently turns out to have been one of complete
safety.32 In such a case the courts have not been at all troubled by
any remoteness or absence of causal connection.
Another specious reason for denying recovery was given in
Ward. The court reasoned that the absence of suits concerning neg-
ligent infliction of mental disturbance without contemporaneous
physical impact demonstrated the concurrence of the bar as to the
soundness of the impact rule.33 Falzone, however, aptly noted:
We do not believe the court meant to imply that it would
deny recovery because of opinions held by lawyers on the
26. 399 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960).
27. Id. at 29, 159 A.2d at 218. (Emphasis added.)
28. See State Rubbish Collector's Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952) (Siliznoff threatened with violence and permitted to
recover for resulting physical and mental injury).
29. Cucinotti v. Ortman, 399 Pa. 26, 27, 159 A.2d 216, 217 (1960).
30. See State Rubbish Collector's Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952).
31. Stokes v. Saltonstal, 13 U.S. (13 Pet.) 114 (1839); Tuttle v. Atlan-
tic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 Atl. 450 (Ct. Err. & App. 1901); Buchanan
v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 52 N.J.L. 265, 19 Atl. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Thornton
v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955).
32. In Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 Atl. 450 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1901), the court noted:
[I]f a defendant, by negligence, puts the plaintiff under a reason-
able apprehension of personal physical injury and plaintiff, in a
reasonable effort to escape, sustains physical injury, a right of
action arises to recover for the physical and the mental disorder
naturally incident to its occurrence.
Id. at 332, 49 Atl. at 451.




legal question presented. And if the court intended to bar
the cause of action because of a lack of precedent in this
State, a sufficient answer is that the common law would
have atrophied hundreds of years ago if it had continued
to deny relief in cases of first impression.
3 4
The most tenable argument against allowing recovery is that of
public policy.5 Three major interrelated contentions have arisen
under the public policy heading.
36 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.37
held that proof or disproof of fear-induced physical suffering would
be so difficult that recovery would be based upon mere conjecture.
In overruling Mitchell, the New York court said "the question of
proof in individual situations should not be the arbitrary basis upon
which to bar all actions .... ,,38 Plaintiff should be permitted an
attempt to convince the jury of defendant's liability.3 9 The diffi-
culty of tracing a causal connection from the negligent act of the
defendant to the injury is not peculiar to cases without impact.
40
Thus mere difficulty of proof should not bar the plaintiff from the
opportunity of attempting to convince the trier of fact as to the
truth of his claim.
41
Another public policy argument is that to allow recovery for
the physical consequences of emotional disturbance without impact
would open the door to fraudulent actions. 42  The allowance of
recovery in the slight impact cases 43 negates the effectiveness of
the impact rule as a method of preventing fraudulent claims.
44
The arbitrary denial of recovery in all cases not falling
within the realm of one or another of the exceptions [to
the impact rule] discourages the bringing of meritorious
actions and at the same time allows the prosecution of
34. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. at 562, 214 A.2d at 15.
35. Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 62 N.E. 737 (1898); Mitch-
ell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Bosley v. Andrews,
393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa.
548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905).
36. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. at 561-63, 214 A.2d at 15-17.
37. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
38. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 732 (1961). (Em-
phasis added.)
39. Ibid. See also Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 152 A.2d 263, (1958)
(Musmanno, J., dissenting).
40. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (prenatal
injuries); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (prenatal in-
juries).
41. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d at 713-15; Falzone v. Busch, 45
N.J. at 562, 214 A.2d at 15.
42. E.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
43. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky.
285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (slight burn); Homans v. Boston Elevated R.R.,
180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight blow); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 73 N.J.L. 577, 87 Atl. 130 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (dust in the eye); Zelinsky
v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (any degree of physical
impact, however slight).
44. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 563, 214 A.2d 15, 16 (1965).
Winter 1966]
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fabricated claims, for surely those capable of perjuring
evidence will not hesitate to manufacture one additional
feature of the occurrence - a slight impact - to insure re-
covery.
45
When Connecticut abolished the impact rule, the court noted
that there was very little additional risk of fraud in allowing re-
covery in the no impact cases than presently existed in the slight
impact cases.4" The Falzone court said:
As to the possibility of actions based upon fictitious
injuries, a court should not deny recovery for a type of
wrong which may result in serious harm because some
people may institute fraudulent actions. Our trial courts
retain sufficient control, through the rules of evidence
and the requirements as to the sufficiency of evidence, to
safeguard against the danger that juries will find facts
without legally adequate proof.
47
The final public policy argument is the ubiquitous "floodgates"
argument. 48 This argument fails since there has been absolutely no
showing that the majority 49 of courts which now allow recovery
without impact have been swamped with such litigation. No court
which has abolished the impact rule has reinstated it because of a
flood of litigation, or for any other reason. The purpose of a court
is to dispense justice, and if the action is meritorious, it must
willingly cope with the increased burden.
[T]he fear of an expansion of litigation should not deter
courts from granting relief in meritorious cases; the proper
remedy is an expansion of the judicial machinery, not a de-
crease in the availability of justice.50
Robb and Falzone definitely are representative of the trend of
modern case law. Today, courts are less prone to deny a remedy
for a substantial wrong for fear of their inability to cope with the
problem. It leaves one to wonder how long Pennsylvania will cling
to the outdated impact rule in the name of stare decisis.51 Rear-
45. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 1, 31 (1949).
46. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941). See
also Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933).
47. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. at , 214 A.2d 16 (1965); see also
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
48. E.g., Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup.
Ct. 1900); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (would open
a Pandora's box).
49. E.g., Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Orlo
v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 23, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Robb v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182
(1933); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150
Atl. 540 (1930); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 327, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
50. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. at 563, 214 A.2d at 16 (1965).
51. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) wherein the
majority said: "What plaintiff is really asking us to do is to review and
change the rule which has been so long and clearly established by our
[Vol. 70
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guard actions such as Bosley v. Andrews may occur, but the trend
of the case law clearly supports the contention that the impact rule
is "destined for ultimate extinction.
52
MICHAEL R. CONNOR
cases, because the courts of many other states and the Restatement allow
recovery . . . ." Id. at 167-68, 142 A.2d at 266.
52. PROSSER, TORTS 351 (3d ed. 1964).
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CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL
COURTS-RULES 42(a) AND (b)
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965)
Al Harris appeared under subpoena as a witness before a fed-
eral grand jury. He refused to answer certain questions on the
ground of self-incrimination. The district court directed him to
answer the questions and instructed him that he would receive
immunity from prosecution in matters to which he testified. Again
before the grand jury he refused to answer. He was taken back to
the district court, sworn, and ordered to answer each question as
it was read to him. He still refused to comply. The district court
then summarily found Harris to be in contempt of court and sen-
tenced him to a year in jail under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.' The court of appeals affirmed 2 but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded.
3
Although the district court's pronouncement was within the
literal scope of rule 42(a) and followed a summary procedure ex-
pressly approved by the Supreme Court under identical facts in
Brown v. United States,4 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and overruled Brown. Rather than utilizing the summary pro-
cedure of 42(a), the district judge should have held a hearing as
provided in 42(b).5 While Rule 42(a) gives the judge power to
summarily punish any contempt "if the judge certifies that he saw
1. FED. R. CRim. P. 42. Criminal Contempt:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts
and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
2. United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964).
3. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
4. 359 U.S. 49 (1959). See also, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610
(1960).
5. FED. R. Cenvi. P. 42. Criminal Contempt:
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt
except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prose-
cuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of
hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the de-
fense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal
contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be
given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the de-
fendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an
attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to
show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a
trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides.
He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the
contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except
with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt
the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
254
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or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court,' '6 the power does not
extend to cases of this kind. The Court gives two reasons for ex-
cluding this conduct from "the narrow category envisioned by
Rule 42(a)."7
First, the majority thought the real offense was committed
outside the presence of the judge and before the grand jury, when
Harris refused to answer as ordered. His second refusal, before the
judge, was not a second contempt.8 This reasoning, however, was
not decisive for the Court assumed arguendo that his second refusal
was a separate contempt committed in the presence of the judge.
The Court's second point, and the basis of its decision, was that
Rule 42 (a) does not apply to all contempts committed in the judge's
presence. Rule 42(a) is applicable when the disruption to the busi-
ness of the court is more tangible. "To preserve order in the court-
room for the proper conduct of business, the court must act in-
stantly to suppress disturbance or violent obstruction or disrespect
to the court, when occurring in open court."9 Here there was nothing
in Harris' conduct requiring "immediate penal vindication of the
dignity of the court."'10 Therefore, Rule 42(b) should have been
followed by giving notice and holding a hearing on the contempt
charges.
A hearing is necessary so that a just sentence may be imposed.
While this record did not disclose any extenuating circumstances,
the Court suggested that fear of reprisal upon the witness might
be the cause of his silence. The sentencing judge should have the
opportunity to learn of such mitigating circumstances so that the
punishment is appropriate."
Since Rule 42(a) was intended to be a restatement of existing
case law at the time of its adoption,12 the Court has relied on its
prior cases in construing the Rule. The Court has long recognized
that a summary proceeding of immediate conviction, i.e., without a
hearing, is proper only when the contempt takes place in the pres-
ence of the court. That procedure is proper because the judge
knows all the facts and a prompt exercise of the power is necessary
6. FED. R. CRiM. P. 42 (a)
7. 382 U.S. at 165.
8. Ibid. The same point, that a second refusal should not constitute
a second contempt was made by the four dissenters in Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. at 54. Harris was first in contempt of court when upon
return to the grand jury room he refused to answer as he had been ordered
by the court. Undoubtedly he could then have been subject to 42(b) pro-
ceedings. See Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209. (lst Cir. 1953).
9. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925).
10. 382 U.S. at 165, citing Cooke v. United States, supra note 9, at 536.
11. Id. at 166.
12. FED. R. CRiM. P. 42(a), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,




to assert the authority, order and dignity of the court. 13 Corre-
spondingly, when the offense is committed outside the presence of
the court, a hearing must be held to determine the facts. Summary
disposition is not required to maintain decorum in the courtroom.
14
Rule 42(a) states the case law rule too broadly. Not all contempts
committed in the court's presence will disclose all the relevant facts
nor will they necessarily so disrupt the court as to require instant
punishment. The Harris facts fit this description. His refusal
in court did not disrupt the court. A hearing was necessary to dis-
close any relevant mitigating circumstances. The reasons for per-
mitting a summary conviction were absent. Therefore a hearing
procedure was necessary.
This restrictive interpretation placed on Rule 42(a) by Harris
is more consistent with the Court's treatment of the contempt power
than was Brown. From the earliest times, the Court has said that
the contempt power should be limited to "the least possible power to
the end proposed.' 5  This standard has been implemented in
several cases, as it was in Harris, by requiring a hearing even though
the contempt occurred in court. Thus, when a defendant was
found to be schizophrenic shortly after his summary contempt con-
viction, the Court ordered a full hearing on the question of his legal
responsibility for misbehavior at trial.16 Likewise, the Court has
ordered disqualification of the presiding judge when the contempt
involved personal criticism and vilification of the judge. The pos-
sibility of biased judgment is very real under those circumstances
and the Court required a hearing before another judge to restore
impartiality to the decision. 17 Like Harris, these cases require a
judge to proceed to punish for contempt only with knowledge of
all the facts and upon impartial deliberation.
Since the exercise of the contempt power is immune from con-
stitutional protections, 8 the Court is guided only by its sense of
fairness and practicality in imposing restraints upon the use of
that power. 9 The procedural safeguard on which the Court has
13. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); Ex parte Terry, supra
note 12, at 308-10.
14. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 at 536 (1925). Cf. In re Savin,
131 U.S. 267 (1889) (misconduct near the courtroom held to be in the
presence of the court).
15. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1824).
16. Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963).
17. This rule was first applied to contempts committed outside the
presence of the court, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). It was
then extended by Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), to contempts
in the presence of the court. It may be a close question whether the con-
tempt charged was so personal as to require the judge's disqualification.
See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 at 12 (1952).
18. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954).
19. The Court may properly rule on these matters because it has
.[Vol. 70
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chosen to rely is the hearing requirement. 20 As a safeguard against
abuse of the contempt power, the hearing depends for its effective-
ness upon the integrity of the presiding judge. The hearing would
be a barren formality for a defendant against whom the judge's
mind was already set.21 Thus, the Harris decision will not satisfy
those who protest that a contemnor, like any other criminal offen-
der, should be entitled to a jury trial.2 2 The Court, however, has
always held this judicial prerogative power to be inherent in and
essential to the court's function. 23 Possibilities for abuse are in-
herent in the process. What the Court has done in previous cases
and again in Harris, is to rely on the integrity of the judiciary,
assuming its ability to arrive at a just decision given opportunity
for fair consideration.
DAVID LEHMAN
supervisory authority in the administration of criminal justice in the fed-
eral courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
20. The Harris opinion approvingly cited the use of Rule 42(b) to
punish similar contempts. See United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Shillitani, 345 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Traumunti, 343 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Castaldi,
338 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1965).
Supreme Court review is not limited to procedural questions. If the
conduct complained of does not appear to have been contemptuous of the
court, the conviction will be reversed. See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230
(1962); Cammer v. United States 350 U.S. 399 (1956). Likewise, if conduct
outside the court's presence was not sufficiently obstructive, contempt con-
viction cannot be sustained. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 28 (1945); Nye v.
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tempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 283 (1962).
23. Levine v. United States, supra note 22, at 615; Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289, 309 (1888); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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